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Abstract: 
This paper takes forward a new agenda for online deliberation - the study of 
everyday political talk in 'non-SROLWLFDO
RQOLQHµWKLUG VSDFHV¶- online communities 
devoted to issues such as parenting, food or sports (author 2012a, b). Online 
deliberation research has identified a series of problems with online debate: it often 
polarises with like-minded people talking to each other; disagreement and/or difficult 
topics are avoided; and it lacks deliberative characteristics and is plagued by trolling, 
flaming and curbing. This paper hypothesises that political talk in third spaces will 
avoid these limitations. It empirically analyses the nature of debate about the 2016 
Australian federal election, in a discussion forum devoted to parenting. It finds that 
debates are broadly rational, with limited negative discursive behaviours. While 
participants lean to the left, there is significant crosscutting political talk and 
GLVDJUHHPHQWDQGGHEDWHVIRFXVRQ
VHQVLWLYH¶WRSLFVVXFKDVLPPLJUDWLRQDQG
marriage equality. 
1
Third Space and Everyday Online Political Talk: Deliberation, Polarisation, 
Avoidance 
Introduction 
Everyday political talk is the foundation stone of the public sphere (Habermas 1974: 
49) and a Òfundamental underpinning of deliberative democracyÓ because Òthrough
everyday political talk, citizens construct their identities, achieve mutual
understanding, produce public reason, form considered opinions, and produce rules
and resources for deliberative democracy.Ó (Kim and Kim 2008: 51) Political talk is,
quite simply, crucial to the healthy functioning of democracy and citizenship
(Dahlgren 2006: 282) because it facilitates political knowledge, engagement and
opinion change (Price and Cappella, 2002; Huckfeldt et al. 2004) and can lead people
to take or call for political actions (Author B et al 2016). Political talk can do this
because it encourages shared perspective building or complementary agency:
intersubjective processes whereby people link their personal ideas, issues, and actions
with one another, cultivating political agency, solidarity and community (McAfee
2000: 134). The potential for everyday political talk to positively influence public
opinion formation, civic/community identity and political participation has led many
people to posit it as an answer to the apparent democratic malaise afflicting many
Western democracies.
While everyday political talk and participation is normatively desirable for many, 
achieving it in practice is difficult (Putnam 2000; Eliasoph 1998). It is thought 
that the Internet might facilitate such talk and action because it has: “redefined 
the practices and character of political engagement” and made “it easier for the 
political to emerge...” by creating greater opportunities for talk from the bottom 
up Dahlgren 2015: 29). However, a number of important criticisms of online 
political debate have been identified. First, online political debate online 
polarises (Smith et al. 2014). This is problematic because “the benefits of 
deliberation depend on disagreement, which is defined in terms of interaction 
among citizens who hold divergent viewpoints and perspectives regarding 
politics” (Huckfeldt et al 2004: 11; Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004). Second, 
people avoid talking about politics or talk in ‘safe’ places on ‘safe’ subjects where 
others hold similar views, undermining deliberation (Eliasoph, 1998; Conover & 
Searing 2005; Mutz 2006). Third, studies of online deliberation typically identify 
a small minority of people that ‘dominate’ debates (e.g. Kies 2010). Deliberation 
requires an equal opportunity to participate (Dahlberg 2001). Active minorities 
might crowd out/silence other participants or sets the topic/terms of debate. 
Fourth, studies of political debate in online political forums often find limited 
evidence of deliberation, with debate descending into aggressive Òflame warsÓ, 
trolling, and people talking at each other rather than listening and debating (e.g. Davis 
1999, Wilhelm 2000) 
This paper takes forward a new agenda for online deliberation: the study of everyday 
political talk in non-political online, Ôthird spacesÕ (author 2012a, b). The paper 
empirically analyses the discursive nature of everyday online political talk about the 
2016 Australian federal election in one such third space: an Australian discussion 
forum devoted to parenting. The paper addresses four research questions:  
1. To what extent do people engage in rational-critical debate?
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2. To what extent do people engage in crosscutting (left-right) or polarised 
political talk? 
3. To what extend do debates involve disagreement, and do people talk about 
sensitive topics? 
4. How do people talk about the process of voting, and do people offer support 
and advice on the process of voting? 
 
As will be explained in more detail below, the paper hypothesises that everyday 
political talk in third spaces has the potential to overcome some of the key criticisms 
of online political debate, and will be of a high discursive quality: 
 
H1. Political talk in third spaces will be rational, critical and discursive 
H2. Political talk in third spaces will be civil, with limited flaming, trolling and 
curbing 
H3. Political talk in third spaces will be crosscutting, with people from the left 
talking to the right 
H4. People will discuss sensitive political topics such as immigration and asylum 
and climate change 
H5. Super-participants will be play a positive role in shaping debates 
 
First, the paper outlines the concept and key characteristics of Òthird spaceÓ. Second, 
the paper outlines the argument as to why everyday online third spaces might mitigate 
some of the problems associated with political debate online. Finally, the paper 
presents a detailed empirical analysis of nearly 700 comments posted in three threads 
that focus directly on the election. This is combined with an over-arching analysis of 
all participants.  
 
The Third Space  
At its most basic, a third space is an online public space that exists beyond home (first 
space) or work (second space) where people can come together for informal 
conversation and socialising. The concept of third space is built on a critique of Ray 
OldenburgÕs concept of third place. As the name suggests, third places are place 
based spaces; the common denominator is the location of the participants and that 
community can thrive: ÒThe third place is a generic designation for a great variety of 
public spaces that host the regular, voluntary, informal, and happily anticipated 
gatherings of individualsÕ and is a core setting of informal public lifeÓ (1999: 16) 
including pubs and cafes and community hangouts. Oldenburg argues that third places 
perform a crucial role in the development of societies and communities, helping to 
strengthen citizenship and thus are Òcentral to the political processes of a democracyÓ 
(1999: 67). While important, Oldenburg believes that third places are declining (and 
often wholly absent) in America. In part, Oldenburg (1999: 77) blames television and 
the Internet: he dismisses virtual community and the network society as a ÒmythÓ 
arguing Òthe new, corporately-controlled technological order has so atomised the 
citizenry that the term ÔsocietyÕ may no longer be appropriate.Ó 
 
While Oldenburg was highly critical of the internet, scholars such as Rheingold 
(2003), Schuler (1996), Bruckman and Resnick (1995), and Wellman (1998) have 
suggested that online communities might be akin to, or are, a kind of third place. As 
Rheingold (2003: 10) notes: ÒIt might not be the same kind of place that Oldenburg 
had in mind, but so many of his descriptions of third places could also describe the 
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WELL [online community]. Perhaps cyberspace is one of the informal public places 
where people can rebuild the aspects of community that were lost when the malt shop 
became a mall.Ó Oldenburg identifies a series of participatory and environmental 
characteristics that must feature for a third place to exist. This includes a group of 
regulars who help to set a light-hearted tone to the debate.  
 
The concept of third space re-theorises key aspects of OldenburgÕs participatory and 
structural characteristics (Author 2012a, b; Author et al., 2016). First, and arguably 
the most important difference, is that third spaces do not privilege place-based forums 
over issue (or other) based communities. Second, rather than using the idea of 
regulars, we use the concept and typology of super-participants. Authors (2014) 
identify three types of super-participant: super-posters (SP1s) who create a lot of 
content (at least 2000 posts); agenda-setters (SP2s) who seed new threads; and 
moderators and facilitators (SP3s) who manage the debate and are broadly equivalent 
to a landlady or landlord. Super-participants help to set the tone and topic of debate, 
and provide a kind of glue that holds virtual space together. Third, Oldenburg argues 
that cutting edge humour Ð the kind that would be offensive in other social contexts Ð 
enhances bonding in third places and is thus a positive environmental characteristic. 
The greater fluidity and (often) weaker social bonds in third spaces means that such 
talk is more likely to be problematic and thus civility is an important criteria. Having 
outlined some key aspects of third place and how this varies in third space, we now 
turn to why we hypothesise that third space might provide an important avenue for 
political talk.  
 
Third Space and Political Polarisation  
The potential for political polarization to occur online is widely recognized. There 
was initial hope that the internet would decrease polarization by broadening peopleÕs 
range of social connections  (McKenna & Bargh, 2000) and by lowering the sense of 
social presence which, in turn, might reduce the perceived risk of political 
disagreement (Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons, 2002; Stromer-Galley, 2003). 
However, the more widely held view is that online political debate becomes polarised. 
Often associated with SunsteinÕs (2001) Daily Me, the fear is that the ability to 
determine what political media one consumes will allow ÔnarrowcastingÕ Ð people 
will choose to avoid content that they disagree with and associate with people who 
hold similar views to their own. For Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson (1997: 3Ð4), this is 
because: ÒIf IT provides a lubricant that allows for the satisfaction of preferences 
against the friction of geographyÓ, such as communicating with like-minded people, 
the internet might lead to apparently Òlocal heterogeneityÓ to Ògive way to virtual 
homogeneity as communities coalesce across geographic boundaries.Ó Research has 
found political polarization in a wide range of online spaces including political blogs 
(Gilbert et al. 2009: 2; Adamic and Glance, 2005; Hargittai, Gallo, and Kane, 2007; 
Lawrence et al. 2010), Twitter (Smith et al. 2014; Himelboim et al., 2013; Lorentzen, 
2014; Conover et al., 2011) and discussion forums (Wilhelm 2000; Davis, 1999; Hill 
and Hughes, 1998). Surveys, meanwhile, identify that there is a more general trend of 
talking politics with like-minded people (Mutz, 2006).  
 
We hypothesise that polarization is less likely to occur in third spaces and that debates 
will be crosscutting (H3). First, to polarize requires that people have relatively fixed 
political identities that they can coalesce around. The stronger a personÕs political 
partisanship, the more likely it is that their discussion network will be homogenous 
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(Brundidge 2011). It seems more likely that people will be more political partisan in 
politically defined spaces. People must actively choose to visit political forums, and it 
follows that these people are likely to be politically minded and have stronger 
political views. In third spaces, the shared tie may be geographical or interest-based, 
but crucially the tie is not political and this makes cross-cutting political talk more 
likely Ð be it by choice or inadvertently. Recent empirical analyses of online 
polarization has found that while online political discussion is positively associated 
with a heterogenous political discussion network that contradicts SunsteinÕs ÔDaily 
MeÕ, it remains relatively weak and Òpeople are not exactly lining up to expose 
themselves to political difference onlineÉÓ (Brundidge 2011: 695). Wojcieszak and 
Mutz (2009: 50) also analyse whether online debate leads people to exposed to 
political disagreement, finding that this is most likely where talk emerges incidentally 
and is not the main focus of the forum and when people are less politically informed: 
ÒInternet users who are not sufficiently engaged in politics to selfselect into explicitly 
political online chat rooms or message boards inadvertently encounter political views 
online in hobby and interest groups in particular.Ó  
 
Third Space and the Avoidance of Politics 
Research shows that people avoid talking about politics; talk only in ÔsafeÕ places or 
on ÔsafeÕ subjects where they perceive others to hold similar views (Eliasoph, 1998; 
Conover and Searing 2005, 277; Mutz and Martin, 2001; Mutz 2006; Noelle-
Neumann 1984); and block or unfriend people with whom they disagree Ð particularly 
weak ties (John and Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015). Avoidance undermines deliberation. Even 
if the discursive environment is heterogenous Òa personÕs political networkÓ may not 
be: Òhearing the other side takes place at the level of discussants within a network 
rather than within some larger, aggregate social contextÓ (Mutz 2006: 12). Building 
on a classic study conducted nearly 50 years ago, it is hypothesised that political talk 
in third spaces is harder to avoid. First, political talk often Òcomes up unexpectedly as 
a sideline or marginal topic in casual conversationÓ (Lazarsfeld et al., 1968: 153).  
 
While third spaces are a form of virtual community with a group of super-participants 
that may have relatively strong ties and sense of community identity, it is not that 
easy for them to just turn off political talk (Bello and Rolfe, 2014: 135). Furthermore, 
the discussion in third spaces has a fluidity that facilitates a wide range of weak ties 
too Ð and these are particularly important to overcoming polarization and the 
avoidance of politics (Mutz (2006: 54). Put simply, we believe Òfragmentation theory 
makes little sense once we move beyond the politically oriented communicative 
landscapeÓ (Author B and 2011: 29). Thus we hypothesise that people will engage in 
political disagreements (H1) across party lines (H3) and on sensitive political topics 
(H4).  
 
Third Space and Discursive Inequality 
Online political debates (and online political participation in general) are often found 
to have highly active minorities that dominate activity (Davis 2005; Author 2006, 
2007). This is problematic for some theories of deliberation, which typically argue 
that deliberation either requires broadly equal participation, or at least the opportunity 
to deliberate equally (Dahlberg, 2001, 2004). However, recent empirical studies of 
online political debate Ð from across both formal party spaces and everyday spaces 
such as help communities Ð have found that these Òsuper-participantsÓ often perform 
a positive discursive role, facilitating debates, setting the tone, and encouraging new 
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users (Albrecht 2006; Author B and Author A 2014; Kies 2010). Building on both 
OldenburgÕs positive analysis of the role of ÔregularsÕ in third places, and the more 
positive analyses of the impact of frequent posters in online political debate, it is 
hypothesised that ÒregularsÓ or Òsuper-participantsÓ have a positive impact on debate 
(H5).  
 
Third Space, Deliberative Breakdown and Incivility 
Online political talk is often found to lack deliberative qualities (Wilhelm 2000; Davis 
1999, 2005), though findings do vary Ð in part due to different definitions of what is 
considered civil (Papacharissi 2004) and deliberative (Author A 2012a). There is also 
significant unease about incivility Ð flaming, trolling, and attempting to shout down or 
silence opposing views Ð particularly in anonymous online spaces (e.g. Santana 
2014). Uncivil content may be exacerbated online because it is positively associated 
with network virality: Òincivility has become an even greater bte noire online than on 
televisionÓ (Mutz 2015: 171, 174). While some criticize civility as a new form of 
censorship (Limbaugh 2011), others argue that ÔuncivilÕ media, such as polarised and 
often confrontational US radio and television talk shows, can have significant 
negative democratic effects (Bennett 2011; Mutz 2015).  
 
We hypothesize that political talk in third spaces will be of a high deliberative quality 
across several criteria. In part, this is because of the weaker potential for polarization 
and avoidance as discussed above (H3, H4). However, we also contend that 
community norms, the ÔregularsÕ, moderation, and other design choices can help to 
encourage more deliberative and civil talk (H5). First, we hypothesise that political 
talk in third spaces will be rational and critical (H1): people will use evidence to 
support claims rather than make assertions and that people will engage in political 
disagreements. Second, we hypothesise (H2) that debates will be civil, with limited 
flaming, trolling and curbing. 
 
Methodology 
This study uses a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of online debates about 
the 2016 Australian Federal Election in an online discussion forum/community 
devoted to parenting. We chose to focus on an online parenting community build 
around a threaded discussion forum because such spaces often feature the social and 
environmental characteristics of a third space - and our initial analysis indicated the 
forum was a third space. We focused on a political event (rather than a more diffuse 
account of politics) for several reasons. First, we have previously captured political 
talk using broad definitions of politics either reading all of the messages (Author B 
and Author A 2014) or using keywords to identify the political debate (Authors B, C 
and A 2016). The focus on a formal political issue is, thus, original. A national 
election was chosen because it is a key moment in democratic/civic life. As noted 
previously, there have been a surprisingly limited number of studies of everyday 
online political talk about elections as most scholarship focuses on how the political 
elite communicates online. Second, while we are in favour of broadening out 
definitions of the political, critics are concerned that results might be more a logic of 
the definition than a reflection of actual political talk. This approach avoids this 
criticism. We selected the specific case because we wanted a strong national and it 
has a strong Australian identity. Second, we initially chose a parenting forum because 
we wanted to compare the data with existing research on UK parenting forums. 
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The method adopted for this study was a manual content analysis. Data was collected 
from the forum using a web-scraper, and stored offline in a database. To identify 
threads that focused on the election we manually searched the thread list as there were 
issues with the websiteÕs search function. These threads were all in a political sub-
forum (news and current affairs). Combined, this may weaken some of the key 
normative benefits of third spaces such as the proposition that political talk is harder 
to avoid in third spaces. In practice, we discovered that there was limited talk about 
the election outside of this section Ðperhaps because moderators moved other threads 
into one big election thread to maintain continuity. One single thread accounted for 
95% of all the posts across the 3 election threads. This moderation policy is likely to 
further impact debate.  
The principal method for analysing the nature of the debate was content analysis. We 
divided the content analysis framework into four separate sections, and they were 
coded in four phases to increase reliability. The coding manuals were tested and 
refined, and coders were trained to enhance reliability. Inter-coder reliability testing 
was conducted using the Re-Cal platform and were found to be reliable:  
 
 KrippendorffÕs 
Alpha 
Agreement (%) 
Election Codes .72 88.9 
Topic of Debate .85* 99.3 
Nature of Debate .87* 95.6 
Table 1: Reliability Test Results (N=71)  (*Includes codes with 100% agreement 
recorded as 1.0 for perfect reliability)  
 
Phase 1: Nature of Debate 
First, we will present our method for analysing the nature of debate. Our initial step 
was to analyse the discursivity of debate: messages were coded as a standalone 
comment when they did not reply to another message; coded as a Seed message if they 
were at the start of a thread; a reply when messages replied to another message; or a 
reciprocated exchange when there was a comment, reply and a further reply.  Second, 
we analysed whether a message was a rational claim or an assertion: was a claim 
supported with some kind of reason or evidence or was it just a claim? For example, 
ÒLaborÕs negative gearing policy is crazy because it will harm the middle classÓ 
would be coded as a rational claim whereas ÒLaborÕs negative gearing policy is 
crazyÓ would be coded as an assertion.  Finally, we coded for critical reflection: a 
rationalised claim that directly challenges or refutes another claim in the thread or 
beyond. This is indicative of crosscutting political talk. The final step was to analyse 
for negative behaviours. We coded for degrading comments that attempted to lower 
the character, quality, esteem or rank of another participants or the participantÕs 
claims e.g. ÔyouÕre an idiotÕ; Ôyou donÕt know what youÕre talking aboutÕ; Ôit is stupid 
to argue that climate change is realÕ. Curbing messages were attempts to suppress or 
restrict another participantÕs claim, argument, position, opinion, or statements in 
general. This includes statements like Ôyou donÕt belong in this forumÕ, Ôshut upÕ, and 
Ôyou need to stop postingÕ. Finally, flaming was coded in messages where people used 
foul language or were aggressive. We also coded for one further positive behaviour, 
when users acknowledged other users with words of encouragement, compliments, 
thanking and statements of sympathy such as ÔyouÕre amazingÕ, Ôgreat workÕ, and 
Ôthanks for your supportÕ.  
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Alongside these codes, we also recorded whether a poster was a super-poster (more 
than 2,000 posts); the total number of posts made in the three threads by each 
participant; and whether the post was made my a moderator or community staff 
(which was clearly identified) to add granularity to the analysis and to allow us to 
assess the impact of super-participation and the regulars (Author B and Author A, 
2014).  
 
Phase 2: Topic of Comments 
Our third phase focused on what we had identified as key topics in the election, to see 
the extent to which they have been picked up and commented on within the forum. 
This is not an exhaustive list, though having read all of the comments we believe it 
did cover a significant amount of all of the political talk. This was not a dominant 
code (in other words, if people talked about the environment and infrastructure in the 
same comment it would be coded twice): 
 
¥ Environment: climate change, agriculture, animals; 
¥ Asylum and Immigration: turnbacks, offshore detention, rights of immigrants, 
integration of immigrants 
¥ Indigenous Affairs: land rights, indigenous education, health, equality, racism 
towards indigenous Australians 
¥ Science and technology: research, science, space, tech industry 
¥ Education: schools, universities, childcare/pre-school 
¥ Economy: budget, deficit, growth, health of economy, who people trust to run 
economy, unemployment, jobs 
¥ Housing and Real Estate: rental prices, negative gearing, house costs, house 
building, apartment block development 
¥ Infrastructure: roads, public transport, airports, NBN and internet cabling 
¥ Health and welfare: Medicare, Centrelink, benefits, hospitals, doctors  
 
Phase 3: Political Views and Polarisation 
This set of codes analysed whether each individual participant in the thread expressed 
either a direct political affiliation (e.g. ÔI support the GreensÕ) or a general political 
affiliation (e.g. ÔI vote for left-leaning partiesÕ). We used this to analyse the spread of 
political affiliations of users; the total numbers of comments of people from the left 
and right (by marking every comment from someone said they voted Labor or left 
with their view); and whether people engaged in crosscutting political talk between 
left and right. Occasionally, people made who they voted for explicit without 
specifying a party or stating a left/right affiliation (e.g. "I believe in higher taxation 
and a strong welfare state and more funding for schools" would be coded as left-
leaning; statements such as "I believe in marriage equality" were not coded as this can 
apply to left or right). As this proved reliable, we included these as well as left or 
right. Where people stated which party they supported or voted for, this was coded as 
their political view throughout. If people stated they voted in a certain direction, we 
checked their other posts to see if there were specific statements of support for a 
party. Similarly, where no political affiliation was given in the first comment of a 
poster, we checked their other comments to see if a political affiliation was given. 
Where people contradicted themselves (very rare), this would be coded as unclear. 
Our categories were: Left, Labor Party, Liberal, National, Green, Independent Right, 
Independent Left, Independent unspecified (states supports independents with no 
other clarifying information), Left, Right (including statements such as I support the 
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Coalition), undecided (e.g. I am still thinking, I am not sure) and unclear (where no 
view was given, or it was unclear/contradictory). To analyse polarisation, we linked 
peopleÕs political views to the discursive structure of the debate to see whether people 
identifying as left or right (and so on) were engaging in debate with each other, and 
how. 
 
Political Affiliation and Polarisation 
There were 71 users participating in the three election threads of the forum. A user is 
considered a participant if they post at least once. For each of these users we further 
identified which parties or ideology they identified with. Table 1 shows that 28 
participants self-identified as left, Labor or Green, with only 13 users identifying as a 
conservative voter. A further 29 users were either unclear or undecided about their 
political alignment. This indicates that this third space has the potential for 
crosscutting political talk, though participants appear to lean to the left.    
Table 1: Political Affiliation  
Political 
Identification 
No. of posts No. of users No. of Super-
posters 
No. of 
comments by 
Super-posters 
Left 194 20 8 62 
Right 11 3 2 8 
Labour 83 3 3 79 
Liberal 131 5 2 14 
National 0 0 0 0 
Green 88 5 3 55 
Independent 
unspecified 
6 4 0 0 
Undecided 13 3 1 11 
Unclear 66 26 14 30 
Total 594 71 33 259 
 
This imbalance is compounded because people from left commented more frequently. 
On the right, there was one Liberal-affiliated user that posted the majority of 
comments. We also analysed the Ôsuper-postersÕ (users who had posted more than 
2000 comments on the forum) and discovered that while there were only 3 super-
posters who were self-declared Labor voters, they were extremely active within the 
thread. These three Labor supporters combined were responsible for 79 of the 
comments, highlighting the dominant role their voice played within the election 
debates. Right leaning and Liberal associated Ôsuper-postersÕ were infrequent posters, 
by comparison, with only 22 comments combined. Super-posters in total contributed 
31% of the total number of posts, which slightly less than overall average. Focusing 
on the top 10 posters within the three threads, they had made 65% of the comments. 
Further discrete analysis is required of their posting behaviour. However, given the 
overall positive findings, in which they were key participants, they can be said to have 
had a positive impact on debate (H5 Ð Graham and Wright 2014)  
While there were some inequalities in participation, there is still a significant amount 
of crosscutting political talk (40%) in which someone who self identifies as from the 
left engages with someone identifying as from the right (figure 1). So while most 
posts came from people with a left-leaning affiliation, posters from the right actively 
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engaged in these debates (and avoiding talking amongst themselves completely Ð see 
figure 1).  
The crosscutting political talk is visualised in figure 2 using a social network analysis 
map created with NodeXL. In the map, users are clustered by affiliation, so  Labor 
voters are in G2 and Liberal voters are in G5 and there is a significant amount of 
debate (as visualised by the lines) between these groups. Indeed, the dominant profile 
is for people to engage across different political affiliations, with relatively limited 
debate amongst explicitly likeminded (e.g. green-green, Labor-Labor) people. This 
supports hypothesis 3.  
 
Figure 1: Cross-cutting political talk
 
 
Figure 2: Social Network Analysis of Crosscutting Political Talk  
 
Note: G1=left; G2=Labor; G3=unclear; G4=undecided; G5=Liberal G6=Green 
G7=unclear 
 
No‐Cross Cut 
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(left‐right) 
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0% 
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While the analysis shows that people are engaging with people who hold a different 
perspective, this does not necessarily mean that they actually disagree with each 
other. It might be that people avoid disagreement and debates become more 
homophilous than is apparent in the network structure. To analyse this, we coded for 
whether people agreed, disagreed, or whether there was neither (e.g. where no 
opinion/argument given Ð neutral statements). As would be expected, most posts were 
neutral (43%), but where an opinion was expressed it was more likely to disagree with 
another poster (33%) than to agree (24% - see figure 3). The next step was to 
determine whether these agreements and disagreements were occurring amongst 
people with similar or dissimilar views. As shown in figure 4, the majority of 
disagreement occurred when talk was crosscutting and so, overall, the debates had a 
significant amount of critical, discursive debate (H1). 
 
Figure 3: Level of Agreement 
 
 
Figure 4: Impact of Crosscutting Talk on Levels of Agreement 
 
 
Nature of Debate 
Within the election threads we found that 81% of posts were Ôreciprocated 
exchangesÕ. A 'reciprocated exchange' differs from a simple ÔreplyÕ (18% of posts) 
and is used to identify the third or more response within a debate. This illustrates that 
conversations in the election threads are not one-way (as further highlighted by the 
fact that only 1% of the posts were Òstandalone commentsÓ), but rather that they were 
interactive with users engaging in a reciprocal discussion (H1).  
In the context of the significant amount of crosscutting political talk with arguing and 
debating, we might expect there to be deliberative breakdown. However, we 
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identified a reasonably high level of supportive and positive acknowledgements 
between users on the thread and very low levels of degrading, curbing, and flaming 
(H2 Ð see Figure 2). When we consider the topics of debates were often quite difficult 
and orientated around sensitive issues Ð for example around asylum seekers Ð and that 
the exchanges were highly interactive, the results suggest these debates were 
deliberative.  
 
Figure 5: The Nature of Debate 
 
 
Figure 5 indicates that the quality of debate is good, with 47% of comments coded as 
a Òrational claimÓ compared to only 15% of comments coded as ÒassertionsÓ (15%). 
A further 15% were Òcritical reflectionsÓ (15%), showing that relatively few users 
provided counter claims that were specifically in response to another userÕs argument 
(though, as noted previously, most posts are neutral and so this figure is somewhat 
distorted). This broadly supports hypothesis 1.  
A closer analysis into the content of the debates suggests users find ways to relate to 
other users who hold differing political alignments and attempt to find common 
ground with each other. Users illustrated a constructive and considerate type of 
engagement where they reflected and expanded upon another userÕs claim rather than 
blatantly disagreeing with it. This is reflected in a specific debate in which a few left-
aligned users discuss with a couple of liberal voters their similar views on social 
issues such as marriage equality and asylum seeker rights. A few users expressed 
surprise at their shared views and further attempted to understand where their 
differences emerged.  
This display of genuine and civil deliberative political discourse emphasises the value 
of the forum as a third space. It highlights how everyday political talk online helps 
individuals to construct their own civic identity while also enables them to 
contextualise their own views amongst others in their community. The practice of 
finding common ground with each other also helps develop a sense of empathy and 
mindfulness with differing views, further strengthening the bonds between members 
of the community and provoking some of the users to consider alternative 
perspectives.  
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The ÔToo DifficultÕ Box?  
There were three key themes that were prominent in the election threads. First, there 
was a large amount of discussion around asylum seekers and immigration (22% of all 
posts), much of which was about a revulsion for Pauline Hanson and the far right. 
Second, discussions about the economy were prominent (11% of all posts) with users 
comparing the two major partiesÕ differing approaches to economic policy. Third, 
discussion around marriage equality was quite common (9% of all posts). There was 
ubiquitous support for marriage equality with lots of frustration over the proposed 
plebiscite and Turnbull; many users voiced their desire for the bill to be passed and to 
stop wasting time and taxpayersÕ money. It was noticeable that the environment and 
real estate were barely mentioned (2% and 0.3% of all posts respectively). There was 
also a notable lack of discussion surrounding indigenous affairs (only one post 
mentioned indigenous issues and that was in relation to the first indigenous woman to 
be elected into the House of Representatives).  
Figure 6: Topic of Debate 
 
 
The analysis of topics indicates that people did not avoid difficult or sensitive topics 
(Mutz 2006; Eliasoph 1998) and there was critical debate on issues such as 
immigration and asylum Ð supporting hypothesis four. Discussion of marriage 
equality, however, was homogenous with many Liberal voters critical of the partiesÕ 
own policy for a plebiscite. This is not particularly surprising as the policy was the 
result of a deal between the left and the right of the Liberal Party when Malcolm 
Turnbull took power and national surveys indicate it is highly unpopular. 
 
Conclusion 
The findings suggest that third spaces provide an important arena for everyday 
political debate. The debates analysed here were of a high quality overall, and did not 
feature many of the issues identified with online deliberation. Indeed, the results 
support each of the 5 five hypotheses. Overall, the political talk was critical in tone, 
with people engaging in deep debates rather than standalone comments and generally 
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using evidence to support claims (H1). Similarly, there was very limited evidence of 
negative discursive behaviours (H2). These findings are rather different to many 
studies of political debates in political forums (e.g. Davis 1999, 2005; Wilhelm 2000). 
This appeared, in part, to be because of a supportive environment with a shared 
interest and many people knew each other and had trust Ð key features of third spaces 
(Author A 2012b). The moderators did not play a significant role within the thread, 
though they did move other threads to these to centralise the talk. Although 
participants were predominantly from the left, crosscutting political talk was 
relatively common (H3) and often involved disagreement Ð supporting survey 
research by Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) and Brundidge (2010). Participants with 
right-leaning views were acknowledged by left-leaning people with phrases like "we 
still love you" or "we shall agree to disagree". This created a relatively easy platform 
for more right-winged users to voice their opinions. The topic of debate was 
dominated by sensitive political issues (H4) such as asylum and marriage equality, 
which makes the tone of the debate all the more impressive Ð suggesting that people 
did not avoid political talk (Eliasoph 1998; Mutz 2006). Within these different 
characteristics, super-participants seemed to play an important role in helping to set 
the tone and structure (H5), though furher research is necessary to unpack their actual 
impact (Graham and Wright 2014). 
While these results suggest some promise for political talk, there are limitations. First, 
this is an individual case study, using a small sample, and during an atypical election 
period. Second, it would add greater weight and validity to the findings if they were 
compared with debates on the same topic and time in a political discussion forum. 
Third, the case study was a parenting forum. It seems likely based on anecdotal 
evidence that the vast majority of posters are women and gender is likely to at least 
partially help to explain the positive findings presented here. More research is, thus, 
sorely needed.   
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